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Abstract
This paper considers the effects of corruption and government spending on economic growth. It starts from
an endogenous growth model and extends it to account for the detrimental effects of corruption on the
potentially productive components of government spending, namely military and investment spending. The
resulting model is estimated on a sample of African countries and the results show, first, that the growth
rate is strongly influenced by the interaction between corruption and military burden, with the interaction
between corruption and government investment expenditure having a weaker effect. Second, allowing for the
cyclical economic fluctuations in specific countries leaves the estimated elasticities close to those of the full
sample. Third, there are significant conditioning variables that need to be taken into account, namely the
form of government, political instability and natural resource endowment. These illustrate the cross coun-
try heterogeneity when accounting for quantitative direct and indirect effects of key variables on economic
growth. Overall, these findings suggest important policy implications.
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1. Introduction
The effect of corruption on economic growth has been extensively researched in the last two decades.
Most studies have followed the approach of Barro (1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992) and have regressed
cross-sectional estimates of corruption on the average rate of economic growth and a set of control variables.
While not denying that corruption may have played a positive role at particular times in specific countries,
the main findings of the empirical literature have been that corruption is endemic and pervasive and tends
to lead to lower growth, hampering both private and productive government spending in investments and
inhibiting the efficiency of public services (see, for a review, Aidt, 2003; Svensson, 2005). The literature
remains divided on the channels through which corruption is transmitted and the size of the direct and
indirect impact of corruption on the growth rate. The seminal work by Mauro (1995) found that much of
the effect of corruption growth comes through its effect on investment, while Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004)
find that the indirect effects of corruption on human capital, political stability, and trade openness are also
important. Corruption can also affect the growth rate through distortions in tax collection, the level of
public expenditure and the composition of government expenditure. Rose-Ackerman (n.d.) suggest that
corrupt government officials may come to prefer the types of expenditure that allow them to collect bribes
and to keep them hidden and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggest that large expenditures on specialised items
such missiles and bridges, whose exact market value is difficult to determine provide more opportunities for
corruption. It is certainly likely to be easier to collect substantial bribes on the high technology defence
component or infrastructure projects than on teacher’s salaries (Mauro, 1997). For example, the limited
competition in defence sector may lead t o a relatively high level of informal contracts and to rent-seeking
activities, providing fertile ground for the growth of corrupt practices and so increase the cost of military
activities, encourage rent seeking in the military sector and crowd out productive investment in the private
sector. In other areas, such as health, the picture is less clear-cut: opportunities to collect bribes may be
abundant in the procurement of hospital buildings but more limited in the payment of doctors’ and nurses’
salaries. Indeed, Gupta et al. (2001) find that corruption increases the proportion of military spending
in GDP and total government spending, more so than in the case of education and health (Tanzi, 1998;
De La Croix and Delavallade, 2007).
This paper considers how the effect of the different components of government expenditure on economic
growth is influenced by good or bad governance. A simple illustrative growth model is developed from
the endogenous growth model of Barro (1990), assuming that the military sector and government spending
in investments are potential productive inputs and so can affect long run economic growth, and allowing
corruption to influence the allocation of public spending. This approach follows Mauro (1997) in using
different types of public spending to evaluate the effect of corruption, but also the suggestion of De La Croix
and Doepke (2009), who model the different kinds of budgetary distortions that can be caused by corruption.
Thus, while corruption acts as a proportional tax on a budget surplus, the heterogeneous productivity of
inputs assumed in the production function may also distort the composition of public spending, which is in
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line with the empirical analysis in Mauro (1998) and d’Agostino et al. (2011). In addition, to estimating the
direct effects, this paper also undertakes an empirical analysis of the size of the indirect impact of corruption
on growth rate through the public expenditure channels.
The analysis presented here moves beyond cross-country differences, as enough within-country variation is
available for regressions of the growth rate of GDP on the components of government expenditure, corruption
and other control variables. In line with the theoretical model, the public sector covariates are allowed to
have some contemporaneous feedbacks on the error term, and following Dollar and Kraay (2004), Loayza
et al. (2005) and Chang et al. (2009), the generalised method of moments (GMM) procedure that addresses
endogeneity and controls for unobserved country specific factors is used. Thus, estimates of elasticities for
policy variables that are, in principle, subject to improvement through economic and institutional reforms are
provided. This represents a departure from studies that simply interact covariates and test whether country
characteristics, such as the level of corruption, may have differential effects in the relationship between
government expenditure and the growth rate. Instead, the direct and indirect effects are estimated, using
an auxiliary regression for each covariate and the estimated parameters to calculate the indirect elasticities.
In investigating the detrimental effects of corruption on economic growth, it is useful to consider countries
where the level of corruption is permanently high. This motivates the choice of a sample of Africa countries
for this study, where the corruption perception index extracted from African development indicator dataset
(World Bank, various years) showed stable patterns of disparities with the developed countries over the
last decade. The empirical results, using a recent panel from 1996 to 2007, confirm the endogenous model
predictions. While government spending in investments enhances economic growth, large military burden
and current (non capital) government spending cut GDP growth and corruption has a negative impact.
Significant indirect effects of corruption on economic growth are found for each components of government
spending. There is also an asymmetric relation, with the negative effect of military spending on growth being
consistently influenced by the indirect impact of corruption on military burden, but with different results
for countries with high and low levels of corruption and military burden.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2, briefly reviews the baseline growth frame-
work and Section 3 presents the endogenous growth model extended to allow for the detrimental effects
of corruption and derives the expected effects of the model parameters using comparative statics. Section
4 offers insights about the dataset and variables used, while Section 5 discusses the methods used in the
empirical analysis and related issues. Section 6 provides a discussion of the empirical results, includes various
checks of the robustness of the results. Concluding remarks are then presented in section 7.
2. Preliminaries: the baseline model
Consider an economy where a representative household maximises an utility function choosing the op-
timal amount of private consumption. The agent produces a single commodity, which can be consumed,
accumulated as capital or paid for as an income tax. The objective is to maximise the discounted sum of
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future instantaneous utilities:
MAX
∫ ∞
0
U(c)e−ρtdt (1)
where c describe the amount of private consumption, and ρ is the subjective discount rate. Thus, the
instantaneous utility function of private consumption is modelled by a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) function, described as :
U(c) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ . (2)
Following Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996), the production function is modelled as interaction
between private capital k and total public spending G, which is disaggregated into military spending M ,
government investment I and an expenditure for current government consumption, cp. The production
function in aggregate embodies a technology of constant returns to scale and diminishing returns with
respect to each factor,
y = Ak1−α−β−δMαIβcδp (3)
with the evolution of physical capital is given by:
k˙ = (1− τ)Ak1−α−β−δMαIβcδp − c (4)
where τ is the flat-rate of income tax.
Government uses the total amount of collected taxes (τy) to finance total public spending (G), deploying
them among public productive sectors (M, I) and current government consumption (cp).
The representative household chooses the optimal amount of private consumption so as to maximise (2)
subject to (4) and given the initial level of private capital k. The steady state growth equation is given by:
γ =
c˙
c
=
1
σ
[
(1− α− β − δ)(1− τ)A (gmil)α (ginv)β (gcons)δ
(
G
k
)α+β+δ
− ρ
]
(5)
where γ measures the consumption growth rate, and gmil, ginv and gcons denote the share of government
spending allocated to military spending, government spending in investments and current government con-
sumption, respectively. The government-specific parameters α, β and δ, and are assumed to be complements
the private capital. Note that given the components of government spending, the model also corresponds to
the Ramsey specification where diminishing returns to private capital are assumed.
This model assumes that the financing of government spending by income tax is an efficient allocation,
but this can be relaxed by allowing corrupt practices in the economy to induce allocative distortions. This
is done in the next section.
3. The proposed model
Mauro (1995, 1997) provides the first attempts to integrate corruption into the Barro model, considering it
to act as a proportional tax on income. This leads to the prediction that the optimal shares of the components
of government spending is independent of corruption, the ratio of each component of government expenditure
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to GDP remains the same no matter how corrupt or unstable the country is. The more corrupt the country,
the higher is taxation and so the lower is private investment and economic growth. This does seem rather
restrictive and, to develop a more general model, it seems reasonable to assume that the government follows
some specific rules:
Mh1 = h1gmilG (6)
Ih2 = h2ginvG (7)
cph3 = h3gconsG (8)
These rules determine the allocation of public spending, between the military, investment and government
consumption components, net of the estimated value of corruption, where h1, h2 and h3 are parameters that
range between 0 and 1. This allows the detrimental indirect effects of corruption on each component to be
identified. It also allows the degree of exposure to corruption to differ across categories of productive public
expenditures (see, Mariani (2007); Acemoglu and Verdier (1998); Delavallade (2007)). Substituting (6)-(8)
into (5) gives the steady state growth equation:
γ =
c˙
c
=
1
σ
[
(1− α− β − δ)(1− τ)A (h1gmil)α (h2ginv)β (h3gcons)δ
(
G
k
)α+β+δ
− ρ
]
. (9)
Rearranging this to focus on the allocation of government expenditure into its components and the degree
of corruption, and exploiting the fact that the tax rate τ (and hence G/k) is constant in the steady-state
equation gives:
γ =
1
σ
[
j (h1gmilτ)
α
1−α−β−δ (h2ginvτ)
β
1−α−β−δ (h3gconsτ)
δ
1−α−β−δ − ρ
]
(10)
where j = (1− α− β − δ)(1− τ)A 11−α−β−δ .
To investigate the properties of the model, the optimal levels of the different components of government
expenditure, gi = [gmil, gcons, ginv], are derived assuming that the rules of financing (6)-(8) are not affected
by corruption and then the conditions for the rules to be affected by corruption in steady state are derived.
Thanking the first rule, realting to military spendig, note that the condition can be can formulated:
3∑
i=1
gi = 1 =⇒ gmil = 1− ginv − gcons, (11)
and the effect of this component of government spending on the growth rate is characterised by the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the financing rule (11) is always binding, the effect of the components of government
spending depends on the relative share of gi public expenditure devoted to each component and their relative
output elasticities. For example, the partial differential of output with respect to gmil,
(a)
∂γ
∂gmil
≥ 0 if gmil
ginv + gcons
≤ α
β + δ
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(b)
∂γ
∂gmil
< 0 if
gmil
ginv + gcons
>
α
β + δ
gives the conditions in which a change in gmil will lead to an increase or a decrease in the long run
economic growth rate, respectively.
Proof. Equation (10) can be combined with (11) to give:
γ =
1
σ
[
j (h1gmilτ)
α
1−α−β−δ [h2 (1− gmil − gcons) τ ]
β
1−α−β−δ [h3 (1− gmil − ginv) τ ]
δ
1−α−β−δ − ρ
]
, (12)
meaning the partial derivative of γ with respect to gmil is:
∂γ
∂gmil
=
1
σ
{
1
1− α− β − δ
[
α
gmil
− β
ginv
− δ
gcons
]
λ
}
(13)
where λ = j (h1gmilτ)
α
1−α−β−δ (h2ginvτ)
β
1−α−β−δ (h3gconsτ)
δ
1−α−β−δ > 0 and (1/1− α− β − δ > 0). Thus,
the sign of the partial derivative depends on the last three components of equation (13) and the condition
∂γ
∂gmil
≥ 0 requires that αgmil −
β
ginv
− δgcons ≥ 0, or that αgmil ≥ 0
β
ginv
+ δgcons , which can be manipulated to
prove the proposition. These steps in the proposition can be applied to the other components.
Now the effects of corruption can be introduced into the model. This is done by allowing decisions on
resource allocation in each sector to be influenced by the expectation of private gain by bureaucrats or policy-
makers, rather than the allocation of government spending being driven exclusively by social needs. The
model also allows the degree of exposure to corruption to differ across categories of government spending,
a useful property given that some categories such as defence do seem more suscepible to corrupt practices
(Gupta et al. (2001)). To operationalise the model, the following assumptions are made:
A.1. Corruption has a negative impact on growth, i.e. ∂γ∂h < 0. This excludes the possibility that it
might promote economic growth, by relaxing inefficient and rigid regulations imposed by government (see
for example, Dreher and Herzfeld (2005)).
A.2. The inefficiencies due to corruption are negligible for current government expenditure, that is h3 ∼= 1
in (8). This seems reasonable as it should be easier to collect bribes on large infrastructure projects or high
technology defence equipment than on current expenditure, such as nurses’ or doctors’ salaries (Mauro,
1998).
A.3. The productivity of the categories of public expenditure is not homogeneous. In particular, in the
production function (5) β (government investment spending) is greater than α (military spending).
Finally, this model can also account for the indirect effects of corruption:
Lemma 1: Given assumption A.3, the mixed partial derivatives of γ, with respect to gi = [gmil, ginv]
and hi, can account for the detrimental effects of corruption if the following inequalities are satisfied:
(a)
∂γ
∂gi
> 0 | ∂γ
∂hi
< 0 =⇒ ∂γ
∂gi∂hi
6 0
(b)
∂γ
∂gi
< 0 | ∂γ
∂hi
< 0 =⇒ ∂γ
∂gi∂hi
> 0 (14)
The proof of this follows from Proposition 1 and assumptions A.1-A.3.
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It is worth noting that when the impact of government spending is positive, as in case (a) of equation
(14), the mixed partial derivate conditions imply that the indirect impact on the growth rate is negative, with
a reduction in utility resulting from increases in government spending. When it is negative, as in case (b),
they predict that the negative effect of government spending on the growth rate is enhanced by corruption,
suggesting complementarity between corruption and government spending.
Figure 1 presents the simulation results for the effects on growth of changes in military spending (τgmil)
and government investment spending (τginv) as shares of GDP. The solid line representing the baseline case
in which corruption does not affect the growth rate (i.e., h1 = h2 = 1), with the parametrs used to calibrate
the model mainly taken from Devarajan et al. (1996). The left hand panel shows that an increase in the
share of of military spending initially has a positive effect on the growth rate, but then its effect becomes
negative, while the right hand panel shows that for investment spending the positive effect is more sustained.
So reallocating funds from military spending to public investment is likely to increase growth. These results
also clarify the conditions under which the growth rate rises when government spending falls. It is when the
share of government expenditure is less that its optimal share (g∗i ), with the precise path it takes depending
on the relative productivity of the different sectors. The broken lines show the degree to which corruption
can reduce the the impact of these spending categories on growth (i.e., hi < 1, with i=1,2). As expected,
the interaction of corruption and government investment spending does the most damage.
Notes: gmilτ and ginvτ represent the shares of military and investment spending in GDP, respectively, while h1 and h2 illustrate
the inefficiencies due to corruption in the two public sectors. The parameters used for the simulations are: α = 0.1, β = 0.2,
η = 0.6, A = 0.7, ρ = 0.02.
Fig. 1: Simulations of the effects of corruption on the relationship between the components of government
spending and the growth rate
In Figure 2 the simulation results are consistent with the expected signs in (14), with the left hand panel
showing that being more productive investment spending is able to shift the optimal level of ginv to the right,
7
Notes: For the parameters used for the simulations of partial and mixed derivative functions, see Fig 1.
Fig. 2: Partial and mixed partial derivate functions of government spending components and corruption on
growth
with the derivative of γ, with respect to ginv, indicating a positive effect up to a share of 20%. The right
hand panel shows the effects on growth of the interaction between corruption and the government spending
components, with corruption causing a slight reduction on the effect of government investment spending and
enhances the negative effect that military spending has on the growth rate.
4. Regression specification and data
In operationalising the model the first step is to extend the traditional cross section model into a panel
data form by specifying as:
γit = ψ0 + ψ1X
1
it + vi + ηt + eit (15)
where i and t characterise each country and time period (with t = 1, 2, ..T ) and γit is the average annual
growth rate of GDP for country i during period t. X1it = [milit, invit, consit, corrit] is the vector of covari-
ates of government spending components, expressed as a share of GDP, and corrit an index of corruption,
with (ηt) and (vi) unobserved country and time specific effects. It is important to point out that, when
h1, h2, h3 = 1, equations (6), (7), (8) allow us to define milit = τgmil = Mh1/y, invit = τginv = Mh2/y and
consit = τgcons = Mh3/y. The explanatory variables are potentially endogenous in the sense that they are
correlated with eit and as the model presented in section 2 takes advantage of out-of-steady-state dynamics,
there is an identification issue for A in equation 3. As Mankiw et al. (1992) points out, if countries have
permanent differences in their production functions, i.e. different initial technological development, these
A’s would enter as part of the error term and would be positively correlated with initial per capita income,
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i.e. eit = f(A). To deal with this, A is modelled as A = ψ2log(Yt−1) + e∗it and included in equation (15).
Following Barro (1990) private investment in GDP (privinvt) is also included as an explanatory variable,
giving:
γit = α+ ψ1X
1
it + ψ2yit−1 + ψ3p invit + vi + ηt + µit . (16)
The dataset used to estimate the model (16) covers 22 African countries over the period 1996-2007 and is
mainly extracted from African development indicators of the World Bank (WBI). Descriptive statistics are
reported in Table A1 of Appendix A. The government spending components in the vector X1 are obtained
by disaggregating government expenditure into military expenditure, using the NATO definition (all current
and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces, defence ministries and other
government agencies engaged in defence projects and paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and
equipped for military operations and military space activities); gross domestic fixed investment (i.e. gross
fixed capital formation), comprising all additions to the stock of fixed assets (purchases and own-account
capital formation) less any sales of second-hand and scrapped fixed assets by government units and non-
financial public enterprises (variable outlays by government on military equipment are excluded); current
government consumption, current expenditures of goods and services, including compensation of employees;
the share of gross private investment (including private nonprofit agencies as well as fixed domestic assets)
in GDP. Corruption is measured using the WBI control of corruption index (CCI) (a measure based on the
perceptions of firms and is interpreted as indicating the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain, including administrative and grand corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private
interests. It ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived to be non-corrupt. Appendix
A reports the countries covered and the means of each ”key” variable.
A number of control variables are added that reflect the particular strategic and institutional factors
likely to be relevant to this sample of African countries, giving the extended model:
γit = α+ ψ1X
1
it + ψ2yit−1 + ψ3privinvt + ψ4X
2
it + vi + ηt + µit . (17)
where X2i = [regimei, instabilityi, resourcesi] is the vector of covariates that accounts for the form of gov-
ernment, the importance of political instability and natural resources. These variables reflect the recognition
in the literature that there are wider influences on growth. First, institutional arrangements can shape policy
and affect growth, though an autocratic government does not necessarily mean bad economic performance
(Besley and Kudamatsu, 2007)1. It is, however, generally argued that autocratic regimes allocate more of
their economic resources to military spending than democracies (Hewitt, 1992; Sandler and Keith, 1995;
Goldsmith, 2003), while the electoral incentives associated with democracy can lead to policies that promote
1Both the economic literature has found no strong relationship between income growth and changes in democracy, nor
income and democracy (see, Acemoglu et al. (1998); Barro (1999, 160).
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consumption over investment to a greater degree than an autocracy (Huntington, 1968; Rao, 1984). To mea-
sure of form of government the Polity IV dataset is used2, with the index measured on a scale from -10, fully
autocratic, to 10, fully democratic, with regimes being democratic if they have a positive score3. In addition
to the form of government, political instability can also influence growth, through its effect on government
spending. Politically unstable countries tend to devote a more of the budget to public administration and
defence, ostensibly to address internal and external security matters (Morekwa and Schoeman, 2006). More
generally, Alesina (1996), finds that the uncertainty associated with an unstable political environment may
lead to reduced investment and a slowing of the speed of economic development, while at the same time poor
economic performance may lead to government collapse and political unrest. To measure political instability
an indicator is taken from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI)4, which reflects the per-
ceptions of the chance that a countries government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional
or violent means, including armed conflict, terrorism and military coups. It takes values between 0 and 100,
where the maximum degree of instability is 100.
While having an abundance of natural resources can benefit to developing country, it can also cause
it problems. A literature on the ’resource curse’, where a cycle of conflict and poor governance that can
be created when resource revenues are not managed in the interests of the population as a whole (van der
Ploeg, 2006). This is particularly important for Africa, where huge natural resource endowments create
opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour on a large scale, diverting resources away from more socially fruitful
economic activity (Auty, 2001). In particular, Tornell and Lane (1998) show that terms-of-trade windfalls
and natural resource booms may trigger political intrigue among powerful interest groups that can result in
current account deficits, disproportionate fiscal redistribution and reduced growth. In contrast, Deaton and
Miller (1996) and Raddatz (2007) find that natural resources positively affect growth for low-income countries
mediated by higher commodity prices, while others have argued that natural resources can be a curse in
some countries and a blessing in others depending on country-specific characteristics such as inequality or
institutions (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2009). For this study, the current value of exports of primary commodities
as a percentage of average exports in the initial year (2000) is used as a proxy for the importance of natural
resources to the countries.
Given the limited time period and the relatively time invariant nature of the variables, three country
specific dummy variables were constructed from the original indices. Firstly, the regime type, regimei, takes
the value 1 if the country, independently from the quantitative value of the Polity score (i.e., −10 to 0),
is autocratic for more years than it is democratic, and 0 otherwise. The natural resource and instability
2See Gleditsch and Ward (1997) for a further discussion.
3This index takes into account different degrees of autocratic regimes by weighting different institutional aspects such as:
i) the competitiveness of political participation; ii) the regulation of participation; iii) the openness and competitiveness of
executive recruitment; and iv) constraints on the chief executive. Note that this index is not, however, able to capture the
degree of intrusion of the regime in the economic life of the country (see Ndulu et al., 2007, among others).
4See (Kaufmann et al., 2009, 2010) for a methodological discussion of this indicators.
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dummies, instabilityi and resourcesi take the value 1 if the relevant index of a country is higher than the
mean of the sample of African countries and 0 otherwise5.
To get some ides of the distribution of the sample across the continent and its characteristics the map in
Figure 3 shows the African countries covered by the dataset and the countries that present high and low levels
of autocracy, political instability, natural resources. This shows a reasonable distribution across the continent
and a range of country sizes, with reasonable variation across the conditioning variables. A better idea of
the distribution of these characteristics is shown in the graphs of Figure 4, which plot the non parametric
cross country kernel estimates of the density functions for the growth of GDP. These show autocracy to have
a relatively complex relation to growth, having a lower peak growth rate and generally smaller tails, but
not markedly so. While autocracies would seem to achieve lower growth rates in general, some may perform
better than the best performing democracies (Besley & Kadamotsu, 2007). Highly unstable countries seem
to have similar peak growth rates, but higher tails than stable ones, while high natural resource extraction
countries have a lower peak growth rates and a lower tail than low, which is consistent with the findings of
Alesina (1996), Jong-A-Pin (2009), Alexeev and Conrad (2009) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009).
5. Econometric methods and elasticities
Regression equation (17) is dynamic in the sense that it includes the lagged level of per-capita income
as an independent variable. This means that endogeneity bias can arise if the individual fixed effects and
the lagged dependent variable are correlated (Hsiao, 2003). In addition, when adding regressors, correlation
between them and the individual fixed effects can cause inconsistency in least squares estimators. These two
sources of endogeneity bias are addressed in the literature by building a set of orthogonality conditions and
estimating the model with generalised method of moments (GMM), eliminating the fixed effects by first-
differencing the model and including period dummies to account for unobserved time effects (ηt) (Arellano
and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). Note that differencing also eliminates any variables that are
constant over time. Specifying the dynamic panel data model as:
∆γit = ψ1∆X
1
it + ψ2γit−1 + ψ3∆privinvit + ψ4∆X
2
it + µit. (18)
where X1it are the expenditure variables, X
2
it the conditioning variables and privinvit private investment,
clearly gives a specification that violates the assumption of non correlation between the error term µit−µit−1,
and the lagged dependent variable γit − γit−1. Following Arellano and Bond (1991) and Ahn and Schmidt
(1995, 1997), a matrix of instrument Z can be constructed from dependent variables lagged two periods or
more. Under the assumptions of no serial correlation in the error term and weak exogeneity of the explanatory
variables, applying the GMM dynamic panel estimator means using the usual moment conditions:
5The results were found to be robust when the median was used in the political instability and natural resource variables.
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(a) Sample of countries (b) Form of government
(c) Political instability (d) Natural resources
Notes: The sample of countries are shown in graph (a). Graph (b) shows the countries with different form of government, based on
Polity IV index (source: Center for Systemic Peace). Graph (c) reports an index that indicates countries with high or low level of
political instability (source: World Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank (various years)). Based on a proxy which measures the
export of primary commodities, graph (d) shows countries with high or low level of natural resources (source: Africa Development
Indicators (ADI), World Bank (various years)).
Fig. 3: Sample of African countries and geographical distribution by control variables
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Notes: Notes: Plotted are the density functions estimated by using the Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth that minimizes the mean
integrated squared error.
Fig. 4: Density distributions: cross-countries estimates for selected control variables
E [γit−2 (µit − µit−1)] = 0 (19)
E
[
X¯it−2 (µit − µit−1)
]
= 0 (20)
where the vector X¯it−j = [X1it, X
2
it] now includes the covariates in a compact form of the model.
This specification of the components of government spending, with the static government budget con-
straints (i.e. equation (6), (7), and (8)), implies contemporaneous feedbacks to the errors in the growth
equation that may violate the orthogonality conditions. Extending the conditions (19) and (20) to be the
predetermined variables for the government spending variables, deals with this and excludes the influence of
future shocks on the covariates. In addition, notwithstanding its advantages with respect to simpler panel-
data estimators, the difference estimator has important statistical shortcomings. When the explanatory
variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of the variables are weak instruments in the first difference
specification of the growth regression (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This weakness of instruments influences
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the asymptotic properties and small-sample performance of the difference estimator, meaning it is inefficient
and produces biased coefficient estimates that can be large (Roodman, 2009). To prevent this potential
inefficiency and bias in the difference estimator, the specification in differences (18) is combined with the
regression equation in levels (15) into a unique system of equations (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
and Bond, 1998). The set of instruments described above are then used for the regression equation, with
differences and lagged differences introduced as explanatory variables in the levels equation. These are ap-
propriate instruments under the assumption that the correlation between the explanatory variables and the
country-specific effects (vi) is the same for all time periods. That is:
E [γit+pvi] = E [Zit+qvi] and (21)
E
[
X¯it+pvi
]
= E
[
X¯it+qvi
]
for all p and q (22)
where Z is the vector of instrumental variables. By assuming stationarity and exogeneity of future shocks,
the moment conditions for the second part of the system are given by6:
E [(γit−1 − Zit−2) (µit + vi)] = 0 (23)
E
[(
X¯it−1 − X¯it−2
)
(µit + vi)
]
= 0 (24)
Moment conditions (19), (20), (23), and (24) are used to specify a GMM procedure that generates
consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters of interest and their asymptotic variance and covariance
matrix:
θˆ =
(
X¯ ′ZΩˆZ ′X¯
)−1
X¯ ′ZΩˆZ ′γ¯ (25)
AV AR(θˆ) =
(
X¯ ′ZΩˆZ ′X¯
)−1
(26)
where θˆ = [ψi] is the vector of parameters, γ¯ is the dependent variable stacked first in differences and then in
levels and Ωˆ is a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. Estimates
of the variance-covariance matrix are obtained from a two-step procedure. First, estimating the parameters
assuming the residuals µit are independent and homoskedastic both across countries and over time and
second, using the residuals from the first step to obtain a consistent variance-covariance matrix and then
re-estimating the parameters of the model (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
A recent paper by Roodman (2009) argues for caution when using difference and system GMM methods.
He replicates published studies to illustrate how the estimators can generate results that are invalid, but
appear valid. This stems from the ability of the methods to readily generate numerous instruments, which
introduces the danger that the instrumented variables are overfitted. This can mean the method is inefficient
in accounting for the endogenous components and means the estimates will tend to be biased towards the
6For predetermined variables, levels lagged one or more periods are valid instruments. See, for example, Arellano and Bond
(1991, 290).
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value that would be obtained if instrumenting was not used7. To avoid the dangers of instrument proliferation
the empirical analysis below uses only one lag to provide the instruments, then, uses a test strategy for the
GMM regressions that differs from the conventional Sargan (1958) test statistic and offers a theoretically
superior overidentification test for the one-step estimator, based on the Hansen statistic from a two-step
estimator. To allow for the estimators generating moment conditions prolifically, with the instrument count
quadratic in the time dimension, an additional difference in-Sargan/Hansen test is reported. This checks the
validity of a subset of instruments, by estimating with and without the subset of suspect instruments under
the null of joint validity of the full instrument set. The difference in the two reported Sargan/Hansen test
statistics is distributed χ2 distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of suspect instruments8.
While the theoretical model emphasises the interaction between corruption and government spending
in distorting the patterns of growth, the central concern here is the interaction of corruption with the
allocation of funds to the different components of government spending. Rather than following the current
literature (e.g. Lee, 2006) and using interaction terms to address the indirect effects of corruption on
growth, a more general framework is adopted, estimating auxiliary regressions for pairs of variables of
interest [milit, invit, consit, corrit]. The aim of these auxiliary regressions, which control for fixed and time
effects, is to account for the simultaneous correlations between the variables that determine a government’s
choices. They allow for multiple causations and so move beyond the assumption of ”symmetric causation”
that is implicit in the approach that has been used in the literature of introducing interaction terms into the
estimated relation. Direct and indirect elasticities can then be computed from the estimated system GMM
model parameters.
Defining the direct elasticity as:
edγ = piX˜
′
(.,.) (27)
where X˜(.,.) = [m¯il/γ¯, ¯inv/γ¯, ¯cons/γ¯, ¯corr/γ¯] is a vector of the country and period means of the ratios
of military spending, government investment spending and corruption to the growth rate of GDP and
pi = [ψmil, ψinv, ψcorr] is a vector of parameters estimated using equation (25). Taking the military
component of government spending as an example, the estimated direct elasticity is given by:
miledγ = ψˆmil
m¯il
γ¯
(28)
Given assumption A.3, the indirect elasticities can be calculated by using the fixed effects panel data pro-
cedure to regress each component of X˜ on the others, excluding consumption9. For the military spending
component:
milit = a+ b1invit + b2corrit + vi + ηt +mit (29)
7See, Bond (2002) for a technical discussion, whereas for a classical discussion, Tauchen (1986).
8See Baum et al. (2003).
9Note that the use of predetermined variables in equation (18) means that equation (29) is unlikely to include any unobserv-
able factors that are correlated with the errors in equation (18) and so it is not necessary to specify a simultaneous equation
model for the analysis.
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where vi and ηt are the usual country and time effects and mit is the error term. The parameters estimated by
(27) and (29), are then used to obtain the indirect elasticity for military spending with respect to corruption:
mil/g correindγ =
(
ψˆcorr bˆ2
) m¯il
γ¯
(30)
Finally, the total elasticity is obtained as the algebraic sum of the direct and indirect elasticities for each
component of government spending. For military spending this is:
miletotγ =mil edγ +mil/corr eindγ +mil/inv eindγ (31)
Sensitivity analyses of these elasticities can be carried out by changing the points where the elasticities are
calculated, e.g. replacing the means with the median or the interquartile mean of the empirical distribution
of the variables.
6. Empirical results
The first two columns of Table 1 report the results of the system GMM estimation of equations (17)
and (18), including the components of public spending, private investments (I) and time dummies (II),
with column (III) introducing the index of corruption and columns (IV ) to (V I) introducing the control
variables (natural resource abundance, political instability and autocratic regime). All specifications include
the lagged value of private investment to account for capital accumulation, as described in equation (4), and
current government consumption expenditure.
To evaluate the GMM estimator and the validity of the lagged values of the explanatory variables as
instruments, the test described above was used. The results suggested that the hypothesis that the estimated
models are generated by consistent estimators could not be rejected, at the usual 5% level of significance.
The instruments did not appear to weaken the ability of the tests to detect the invalidity of the system GMM
instruments, with the Difference-in-Hansen test giving p− values over 0.1 for all of the models and the tests
of the over-identification restrictions, showing the results to be robust across the different set of instruments.
The estimated coefficients are significant with the expected signs and stable across the different specifications.
They show the accumulation of private investment (privinvt−1) plays an important role in increasing GDP
per-capita over the period. After controlling for time dummies (column III), the share of military spending
in GDP exhibits a strong negative effect on the growth rate, with government investment spending having a
positive effect10. This implies that there is differential productivity between the components of government
spending and suggests that the resources devoted by the government to the military sector are greater than
would be optimal. In line with the results of the kernel estimates, the differential effects of the control
variables are significant, with natural resources having a positive effect on the growth rate and political
instability and autocratic regime having negative effects.
10In line with the literature, a negative impact of current government spending on per capita growth rate is also apparent.
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Table 2:
Multiple causal correlations: fixed effect panel estimations
mil inv corr
(I) (II) (III)
mil -0.896 *** 1.625 *
(0.257) (0.850)
inv -0.048 *** 0.165
(0.014) (0.192)
corr 0.008 * 0.018
(0.004) (0.017)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
BP Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 762.17 *** 401.72 *** 1136.37 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 264 264 264
Notes: The dependent variables are military spending in GDP (mil), government investment in
GDP (inv) and corruption index (corr). Standard errors are in parentheses, while the asterisks
give p-value significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The econometric
specification also includes a constant term. At the bottom of the table Breusch-Pagan (BP)
Lagrangian multiplier test is reported, which is χ2 under the null hypothesis that error variance
in the regression is equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test statistic
excludes the random-effect panel estimator.
Table 2 reports the results of the fixed effect panel data estimations for the auxiliary regressions (equa-
tion 29), used to measure the indirect effects of military spending, government investment spending, and
corruption. It is important to stress that the use of fixed effect panel data estimator is allowed by the static
structure of the government budget constraint, described by equations (6) to (8). The results confirm that
there is causation in both directions between corruption and military spending, implying they complement
each other. Following the discussion of the channels of transmission in the theoretical model, this suggest
that corruption enhances the adverse effect of a larger military sector on the economy’s growth, as it implies
higher rents, involving larger amount of money and so larger bribes (Delavallade, 2005). On the other hand,
corruption is not significantly related to government investment spending, although the sign of the correlation
is as expected. There may be a ”‘substitution effect”’ between military spending and government investment
spending, with the indirect transmission of these effects biasing the estimated impact of the components of
government spending on the growth rate.
Table 3 shows the direct, indirect and total elasticities for military spending, public investment spending
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Table 3:
Elasticity measures, full sample
Direct elasticity Indirect elasticity Total elasticity Indirect elasticity
corruption (+)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
mil -0.203 ** -0.253 ** -0.457 ** -0.046 *
(0.122) (0.089) (0.151) (0.026)
inv 0.703 ** -0.029 * -0.674 **
(0.197) (0.020) (0.198)
corr -0.761 ** -0.043 -0.805 **
(0.234) (0.036) (0.236)
Notes: The direct elasticity measures reported here are calculated from coefficients presented in the third column of Table 1,
whereas indirect elasticities use those reported by the multiple causal correlations estimated in Table 2 at the mean of the sample.
Bootstrapped standard errors (10.000 replications) are in parenthesis, while the asterisks give the p-value significance levels:
∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. From Table 2, we know that the relationship between military spending in GDP (mil) and the
growth rate of GDP includes significant effects of government investment in GDP (inv) and corruption (corr); column IV (+), gives
the specific impact of corruption.
and corruption calculated from equations (27), (30), and (31) in columns 1-311. The direct elasticity measures
are obtained using the estimated parameters from the third column of Table 1, while the indirect elasticity
measures use only the statistically significant parameter estimates in the auxiliary regressions12.
Considering the direct channel by which the components of government spending and corruption can
affect the real per capita growth rate, the first thing to note is that the effect of changes in military spending
on growth is significant and negative, with a 10% decrease in the allocation to military spending enhancing
real per capita growth rate by 2%. The effects are even larger for corruption, with a 10% reduction of
the level of corruption increasing the real per capita growth rate by 7.6%. A reduction in government
investment spending by 10% enhances real per capita growth by 7%. These results seem reasonable for this
sample and are consistent with Mauro (1995), Mo (2001) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), who also find
significant and positive effects of reducing corruption on the per capita growth rate using larger samples,
but shorter time series than this study13. The second thing to note is that the model predicts that indirect
effects will enhance the negative effect of military spending and growth through both government investment
spending and corruption. This seems to support the hypothesis that a sector that is open to rent-seeking,
11Since our model supposes that corruption has no indirect effect on government current consumption expenditure, this
variable is omitted from the analysis although we calculate a direct elasticity of government current consumption spending of
−0.732 from the parameters in Table 2
12Given the aim of the paper, column IV of Table 4 reports the indirect effects of corruption itself on the relationship between
military spending and growth in order to separate out the indirect effects of government investment spending.
13Using GMM estimators to treat endogeneity also avoids issues linked with overestimation of OLS parameters.
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such as the military, is affected by corrupt practices somewhat more than other productive sectors. With
respect to the total estimated elasticity reported in column (III) of -0.457, the indirect elasticity of -0.046
represents about 10% of the indirect effect corruption has on the relationship between military spending
and growth. Interestingly, the negative effect of military spending is partly the results of a reallocation
of government investment spending, which responds strongly to changes in the military spending through
”‘within”’ government spending substitution (the estimated parameter of the indirect elasticity of government
spending is -0.207, which is about a 45% of the total elasticity). Since the growth model predicts that annual
total government spending does not change, the effect of military spending increasing is to ”‘crowd out’” the
”‘productive”’ government investment spending, so reducing the growth rate. There is also an indirect effect
of military spending on government investment spending, but this is less pronounced (-0.029, in column 2).
This does seem a reasonable result, as in many developing countries military spending is likely to be financed
by public deficits, which can lead the crowding out of private investment and so reduce growth. Indeed,
private investment has been found to be a complement of government investment spending in developing
countries, so the finding that a change of 10% in government investment spending affects the growth rate by
0.29% through the military spending channel is not unexpected. There is also a significant, though smaller,
effect of military spending on corruption -0.043, representing less than 5% of the total elasticity. This may
well reflect the fact that the structural and institutional mechanisms that have recently been introduced
to combat corruption in some African countries have altered the political structures that led to distortions
and inefficiencies in the allocation of government spending (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998; Delavallade and de la
Croix, 2009). This may also explain why no significant multiple causality between corruption and government
investment spending was found (Table 3), in contradiction to the predictions of our theoretical model and
the conventional literature.
While the indirect effects of these key variables on each other cannot be calculated by the indirect elas-
ticities, this does not mean that the traditional argument that corruption increases the number of public
capital projects and so reduces growth is not valid. The general dynamic relationship between corruption
and government spending does seem to have been weakened through heterogeneous behaviour in the African
countries. Some African governments have responded to economic crises or cyclical downturns by imple-
menting public investment programmes, often associated with anti-corruption policies, although not always
motivated from an awareness of the positive externality effects on the economy. This line of argument is
returned to below in discussing examples of country responses to cyclical and structural problems.
6.1. Robustness
While the estimation results have confirmed the common finding that government investment spending
enhances economic growth, while military spending, current government spending and corruption reduce
it, and that corruption seems to enhance the negative effect of military spending, there are still issues to
consider. First the possibility of significant cross country heterogeneity in the coefficient estimates, which
could mean the results are driven by hidden country variability not captured by the full sample estimates.
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That they depend not on the relation we are estimating but on countries’ specificities. Second, that the
results may be unreasonably sensitive to the control variables discussed earlier and so not robust.
In considering potential heterogeneity, there are not enough time series observations to estimate country
by country and use a mean group estimator, so a check is made by taking the parameter estimates from
the baseline model, dividing the sample into two groups of countries identified to be below or above the
median of the sample statistical distribution with respect to key explanatory variables and using these to
calculate the subsample elasticities. This also provides an indirect check for nonlinearities. Figure 5 shows
the distribution of the direct and indirect elasticities calculated in this way across the key covariates, all
weighted by the mean of the variable of interest and there are some interesting findings. The high military
spending group shows higher negative elasticities (total elasticity=-0.65) than the lower (total elasticity=-
0.29), and larger indirect elasticities, particularly the proportion of the indirect elasticity that reflects the
complementary effects of corruption and military and government investment spending on the per capita
growth rate link. In contrast, corruption and government investment spending have much larger indirect
than direct elasticities, with the former negative and in the range -0.44 to -1.08, and the latter positive in
range 0.42 to 0.98, but in both cases the high value sample is also the most responsive. So countries with
higher values of the variables do seem to have higher elasticities and this will need to be taken into account
in interpreting the results for their policy implications.
To get a better idea of cross country heterogeneity the aggregate coefficients and the individual country
means were used to calculate country specific elasticities and the total and direct elasticities are presented
in Figure 6. For military spending, there is some variation, with Kenya and Madagascar have the largest
elasticities, but for corruption and government investment spending Malawi has strikingly large elasticities. In
the case of corruption it is joined in this by Kenya and for government investment spending by Madagascar,
while for the rest of the countries the measures are in line with the aggregate estimates. Considering
corruption, Kenya has a direct elasticity of 2.7 and Malawi -2.75, but the size of the estimates are the result
of quite different factors. Official statistics show that when the economic crisis affected Malawi at the end
of 2001, it coincided with a marked and unexpected increase in corruption 2000-2002, which led to it being
ranked as the fifth most corrupt African country (see, Figure B1 of Appendix B). After 2001, GDP increased
for the next two years and corruption started to fall and has continued to do so. In contrast, Kenya is known
as one of the most corrupt countries in Africa and remains so. In the Corruption Perceptions Index 2005,
out of 159 countries Kenya was ranked the 15th most corrupt, with corruption particularly rife in strategic
sectors as fuel and seemingly little affected by cyclical economic fluctuations. Real GDP in Malawi grew
by 3.6% in 1999 and 2.1% in 2000, with the Government’s expansionary monetary policy, and the average
annual inflation hovered around 30% between 2000 and 2001, keeping discount and commercial bank rates
high. Indeed, high volatility of the real interest rates from the end of the 1990s saw it reaching over 30% in
2003. In combination with large deficits financed by domestic borrowing this led to a sharp increase in the
government’s interest bill, leading to strict fiscal discipline to avoid a debt explosion and so a contraction
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(a) Military spending in GDP (mil) (b) Corruption (corr)
(c) Government investment in GDP (inv)
Notes: Elasticities use full sample coefficients and mean values for the sub-samples of countries for military spending, government
spending and corruption.
Fig. 5: Estimated elasticities across subsamples
of government investment spending that lasted until 2004 (Whitworth, 2004)14. Malawi and Madagascar
show the largest elasticities for government investment spending in Figure 6, with Madagascar seeing marked
increases 2002-3, and Malawi from 2004. Following a political crisis in 2002, Madagascar attempted to set
a new course and build confidence, in coordination with international financial institutions, identifying road
infrastructure as a principle priority. This is evident in Figure 6 as is the more recent reductions in the share
of government investment spending in GDP, suggesting robustness of the estimates may be questionable.
So there do seem to be reasonable explanations for the large elasticities for these countries and why they
may be influencing the elasticities disproportionately. To assess their impact on the results, further tests
where undertaken replacing the mean with the median and interquartile range. As reported in Appendix C
(Table C1) and Appendix D (Tables D1 and D2) these aggregate and country level estimates, which remove
the influence of the extreme values, were consistent with the results using the mean. This means that the
countries with high elasticities are not disproportionately influencing the overall results.
14Budget deficit went from 3% of GDP in 2000 to 9.2% in 2003.
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(a) Military spending in GDP (mil)
(b) Corruption (corr)
(c) Government investment in GDP (inv)
Notes: The elasticity measures for each country use the parameters from the full-sample estimations weighted for the mean of the
country in the sample period.
Fig. 6: Estimated elasticities across countries
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6.1.1. The role of the political instability, natural resources and form of government
As a further check on the robustness of the results, the sensitivity of the parameter estimates to changes in
the conditioning variables is investigated. To do this, the baseline model is estimated for groups of countries
selected by whether or not they have high or low values of each of the conditioning variable, as shown in
Table A1 of Appendix A.
Columns I and II of the Table show the results for the sub-samples of high and low levels of natural
resources. Interestingly, the coefficient on corruption is only negative and significant for the subsample of
countries with high levels of natural resources, while for the same group military spending is insignificant.
This does seem consistent with the full sample estimates in Table 1, column IV. Leaving out distributional
effects, it seems reasonable that countries with natural resources are more able to afford military spending.
Indeed, it may also be that the military are important for supporting/protecting the extraction and sale
of outputs, which could offset the expected negative impact of military spending that is generally found
in the literature. As expected, the estimated coefficient for the growth of government investment spending
is positive and significant. The next two columns (III) and (IV) show the results for high and low levels
of instability. For high levels of instability only military spending is significant and that at 1%, while for
low levels, corruption has a significant negative effect as does government consumption expenditure. This
does suggest that the model tells us little about the determination of growth in unstable countries, which
is consistent with findings that instability does act as a fetter on the growth process (Blomberg, 1996).
Finally, columns V and VI show the results for countries with high and low levels of autocracy. Although
the estimated parameters of autocratic regimes were of the expected sign and magnitude, they were not
significant, probably because of the relatively small size of the subsample. For the non autocratic subsample
there is a clear significant negative effect of corruption and military burden as well as a positive effect of
government investment spending.
To investigate the sensitivity to the control variables further, the indirect elasticities were computed for
the main variables using equation (30). The full results of multiple causation correlations are reported in
Table E1 of Appendix E using the equation (29) for each key variable. Using only the significant coefficient
estimates of GMM-system for each control variable subsample, the importance of the indirect channels on
the economy is evaluated. Figure 7 plots the elasticities calculated in this way and shows the impact of
the key explanatory variables on economic performance to be relatively robust, in the sense that the size
of the elasticities is in line with those of the full sample. Breaking the results down into elasticities, show
the significant effect of corruption on growth for relatively resource abundant countries to come through
both direct and indirect channels. Military spending only has an indirect effect and government investment
spending has a strong direct positive impact. For the low resource countries there is a much higher (negative)
impact of military spending, through both the direct and indirect channels, but only an indirect negative
effect of corruption. This seems consistent with the finding that natural resources can be a source of domestic
conflict and international tension, with those in resource-producing areas not always benefiting from the flows
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(a) High level of natural resources (b) Low level of natural resources
(c) High level of political instability (d) Low level of political instability
(e) No-autocratic regime
Notes: The direct and indirect elasticity measures for each sub-sample use the significant coefficient from the Tables 4 and Table C1
of Appendix C, following equations (28) and (30).
Fig. 7: Estimated elasticities of sub-samples by control variables
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of income and this can both generate grievances and provide the opportunity for insurrection if groups can
get access to the resources (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2009). This can lead to a higher ”productivity” for military
spending, as incumbents need to protect natural resources from internal or external enemies and so military
spending may be positively related to resources revenues and growth.
On the other hand, the link to corruption suggests a negative impact for military spending. In this case
military procurement can be thought of as a part of government revenues that are ”re-invested” in arms
purchases, which have a high probability of involving corruption, with a resulting complementarity effect.
Even with different sources of financing in countries with low level of natural resources, this process may
serve to explain why indirectly a +10% changes in military spending reduce of 2% the per capita growth
for the sub-sample. Furthermore, the fact that resource revenues are often managed non-transparently and
without proper accountability, may lead to large off-budget government investment spending that is open to
corrupt practices, thus explaining the negative indirect effect. Interestingly, government investment spending
has large positive direct effects on growth in both subsamples.
Part c of Figure 9 shows that growth in countries with high level of political instability is heavily affected
by increases in military spending, both directly and indirectly, through the corruption channel15. This might
support Blomberg (1996) argument that military spending can play an important role in providing insurance
against political instability, which is consistent with the higher level of military burden in these countries
and explains a higher elasticity for the subsample of countries with higher levels of political instability. Once
we control for the effect of political instability (Figure 7, graph d), the key explanatory variables appear to
have an impact in line with the results of the full sample model. Finally, the estimated elasticities for the
non-autocratic subsample are close to those of the full sample (graph e), suggesting that this measure of
regime does not seem to capture any relevant differences.
7. Conclusions
Growing concerns that high levels of corruption might reflect detrimental effects on economies have
motivated a large amount of academic and policy-oriented research. Recent work has moved beyond sim-
ply analysing the direct effects and has tried to evaluate how corruption affects the relationship between
government spending and economic growth. This paper has contributed to this literature, by developing
an extended endogenous growth model that allows for this effect and highlighting by simulations the non-
negligible indirect effect of corruption on military spending and government spending in investments that,
given their different ”‘productivity”’, may generate heterogeneous effects on per capita growth rate.
Specifying an estimable form of the model and applying it to a sample of African countries, confirmed the
traditional prediction that government investment spending economic growth, while large military burdens,
15Note that, following equation (30), we estimate a significant correlation only between military spending in GDP and
corruption (second frame, Appendix E) and, simultaneously, the direct parameter of corruption in column I of Table 5.
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current government spending and high levels of corruption have a negative effect. Calculating direct and
indirect elasticities led to the interesting finding that there seemed to be complementarity between corruption
and military spending in the way they affected growth. Although multiple causal correlation were at work
in the African countries, it appeared that corruption accentuated the negative effect of military burden
on the growth rate. In contrast, the effect military burden on the corruption/economic growth link was
much smaller. This suggests that combatting corruption is likely to directly increase aggregate economic
performance, but can also have the added indirect effect of reducing the negative impacts of military burden.
Given the potential importance of these findings a range of robustness test were undertaken. These
suggest that the elasticities of the keys explicative variables of the model were robust to the country hetero-
geneity, although a high persistence of corruption made the Kenya elasticities particularly sensitive. Breaking
the sample of countries into subsamples based on the values of the conditioning variables suggested, that
countries with higher levels of natural resources have a ”‘less unproductive”’ role for the military sector
in protecting natural resource and this offsets the crowding out effect. Those with high level of political
instability seem to have significant negative effects on growth, both directly, through increases of military
spending and indirectly, through the corruption channel. Finally, the form of government does not seem to
have any impact on the results.
Our results provide further evidence of the damaging effects of corruption on developing economies and
go some way to improving the understanding of the channels at work. They highlight the need to identify and
take account of both direct and indirect effect and show that the can be some significant complementarity
effects between corruption and the different categories of government spending. In particular, corruption
seems to significantly increase the negative effect of military spending on growth in these developing countries,
suggesting that combined policies to reduce corruption and reduce military burdens, possibly through regional
security agreements, would be of considerable value.
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Appendix B
(a) Kenya (b) Malawi
(c) Malawi (d) Madagascar
Notes: Data for corruption and government investments are extracted from African development indicator of the World Bank (WBI).
Figure B1 - Patterns of corruption and government spending in investments on GDP
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Appendix C
Table C1
Elasticity measures at the median and interquantile mean
Variables Direct elasticity Indirect elasticity Total elasticity Indirect elasticity
corruption (+)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Median
mil -0.181 ** -0.222 ** -0.403 ** -0.041 **
(0.108) (0.079) (0.134) (0.024)
inv 0.694 ** 0.030 * 0.724 **
(0.194) (0.020) (0.195)
corr -0.823 ** -0.048 -0.871 **
(0.255) (0.040) (0.258)
Interquantile mean
mil -0.184 ** -0.227 ** -0.412 ** -0.041 **
( 0.109) ( 0.080) (0.136) (0.024)
inv 0.892 * 0.038 0.931 **
(0.252) (0.026) (0.254)
corr -0.810 ** -0.046 -0.857 **
(0.251) (0.039) (0.255)
Notes: The elasticity measures reported are calculated from estimates presented Table 1. The labels of the variables are defined in
Section 4. Direct elasticities use the estimated coefficients presented in the third column of Table 1, whereas indirect elasticities use
those in Table 2. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis, while the asterisks stand for the p − value significance levels and
∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. (+) Since the indirect elasticity of military spending depends on government spending in investments and
corruption, the indirect elasticity of corruption on military spending is reported in a separate column.
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Appendix D
(e) Military spending in GDP
(f) Corruption
(g) Government investments in GDP
Notes: The elasticity measures for each country use the parameters from the full-sample estimations weighted for the median of each
country in the sample period.
Figure D1 - Estimated elasticities at the median value, by country
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(h) Military spending in GDP
(i) Corruption
(j) Government investments in GDP
Notes: The elasticity measures for each country use the parameters from the full-sample estimations weighted for the interquartile
mean of each country in the sample period. Interquartile mean is obtained by the mean of each country in the sample period, after
drop-out the values in the first and last quartiles.
Figure D2 - Estimated elasticities at the interquartile mean by country.
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Appendix E
Table E1
Multiple causal correlations: fixed effect panel estimations, by sub-samples
Form of government Autocratic regime No-autocratic regime
mil inv corr mil inv corr
mil -0.732 ** -1.589 ** -0.778 *** -2.225
(0.331) (0.672) (0.281) -2.098
inv -0.038 ** 0.070 -0.110 *** -2.629 ***
(0.016) (0.142) (0.039) (0.701)
corr -0.016 ** 0.017 -0.008 -0.056 ***
(0.008) (0.029) (0.006) (0.015)
BP Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 39.27 *** 299.51 *** 30.07 *** 488.65 *** 160.52 *** 807.66 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Observations 84 84 84 180 180 180
Political instability Countries with higher levels Countries with low levels
mil inv corr mil inv corr
mil -0.759 4.717 ** -0.923 *** -2.862 ***
(0.546) (1.844) (0.182) (0.847)
inv -0.004 0.181 -0.159 *** -1.254 ***
(0.007) (0.145) (0.034) (0.363)
corr 0.013 *** 0.052 -0.024 *** -0.058 ***
(0.004) (0.035) (0.007) (0.018)
BP Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 510.97 *** 20.26 *** 453.77 *** 260.81 *** 319.69 *** 477.45 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Observations 120 120 120 144 144 144
Natural resources sub-sample Countries with higher levels Countries with low levels
mil inv corr mil inv corr
mil -0.732 * 1.863 -0.994 *** -1.811 **
(0.421) (2.123) (0.328) (0.789)
inv -0.035 ** -0.454 -0.053 *** -0.116
(0.017) (0.406) (0.019) (0.181)
corr 0.004 -0.030 * -0.017 ** -0.032
(0.004) (0.018) (0.008) (0.031)
BP Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 551.45 *** 321.47 *** 519.71 *** 272.19 *** 66.37 *** 482.15 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Observations 120 120 120 144 144 144
Notes: The dependent variable are military spending in GDP (mil), government investment in GDP (inv) and corruption (corr),
respectively. In parenthesis we report the standard errors, while the asterisks stand for the p-value significance levels. We have that:
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The econometric specification includes both a constant and time dummies. At the bottom of the
table Breusch-Pagan (BP) Lagrangian multiplier test is reported. The test statistic has a χ2 distribution under the null hypothesis that
error variance in the regression is equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test statistic excludes the random-effect
panel estimator.
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